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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME: THE USE OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN ENFORCING
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Robert L McMurry * and Stephen D. Ramsey**
In fourteenth century England the Crown prescribed capital punish-
ment for Englishmen who defied a royal proclamation on smoke abate-
ment.1 More than five hundred years later in the United States, a cadre
of investigators and prosecutors at the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Justice are
actively and successfully prosecuting criminal violations of environmen-
tal laws. The United States government has yet to subject its citizens to
peril of their lives for environmental violations. However, a growing em-
phasis on the use of criminal sanctions against environmental polluters in
the last decade suggests that their liberty and their fortunes, at least, are
at risk. The government's criminal environmental law enforcement pro-
gram has garnered the attention of corporate directors and environmen-
tal attorneys who must advise their clients that violation of
environmental laws may visit more than bad publicity and civil litigation
on a company, its officers and employees. Jail time and substantial fines
are a reality which the regulated community must recognize and prepare
to confront.
This Article gives an overview of the federal government's increas-
ing use of criminal sanctions in enforcing environmental laws. It briefly
traces the historical development of criminal sanctions in environmental
cases, summarizes significant provisions and standards of liability in en-
vironmental statutes, compares civil and criminal liability issues, and dis-
cusses prosecutorial and defense approaches to criminal environmental
* Associate, Sidley & Austin, Los Angeles, California; B.S. 1970, University of Denver;
M.S. 1971, Illinois State University; J.D. 1982, University of California, Los Angeles. Mr.
McMurry has been Adjunct Professor of Law in Land Use at Loyola Law Schoot, Los Ange-
les, and serves on the State Bar of California Committee on the Environment.
** Partner, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Illinois; A.B. 1969, Princeton University; J.D.
1972, University of Texas. Mr. Ramsey was formerly Chief of the Environmental Enforce-
ment Section of the United States Department of Justice, which supervises all federal criminal
enforcement actions in the environmental area. He is also Vice Chairman of the American Bar
Association Natural Resources Section, Environmental Quality Committee.
1. See Mix, The Misdemeanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 ARIZ. L. REv. 90, 90
(1968).
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cases. It focuses more upon a practical perspective than on a strictly
scholarly look at legal issues and theories. The authors' goal is to give
corporations, individuals and counsel an understanding of-and a man-
agement approach to-criminal actions in the environmental area.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
Environmental statutes generally provide for both civil and criminal
enforcement. The relationship and interplay between the two methods
have defined and characterized federal criminal enforcement efforts.
1
A. Civil Enforcement
Prior to 1981, the government's approach to judicial enforcement of
environmental statutes and regulations was almost exclusively to seek
civil sanctions, penalties and injunctive relief. Little thought was given
to using the criminal provisions of environmental statutes or traditional
criminal law.' From the period from EPA's creation until the mid-
1970's, EPA's focus understandably was on drafting and implementing
an enormously complicated body of regulations within the tight dead-
lines imposed by Congress.' Since the statutes were not generally self-
implementing, there was little law to enforce until EPA's regulations
were in place. Moreover, since the primary statutes then administered by
EPA-the Clean Air Acte and the Clean Water Act'-contained dead-
lines for achieving compliance that had not yet run, there were few viola-
tions to prosecute. Thus, in the early 1970's the efforts of the attorneys
at EPA and the Department of Justice, which represents EPA on envi-
ronmental matters, were primarily expended either on defending chal-
lenges against EPA's promulgation of regulations or on actions against
EPA for its failure to meet statutory deadlines. For these reasons, and
because neither EPA nor the Department of Justice budgeted additional
resources to conduct enforcement activities, enforcement played a decid-
edly secondary role to litigation on the compliance and validity of these
regulations. The relatively few cases which these agencies did bring fo-
2. For example, only 15 criminal cases were brought between December 1972 and No-
vember 1974. See White Collar Crime: A Survey of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 169, 370
n.1721 (1980).
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)) [hereinafter cited as Clean Air Act].
5. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)) [hereinafter
cited as Clean Water Act].
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cused primarily on common law nuisance theories6 or relied on older,
little-used statutes such as the Refuse Act.7
In 1977 a confluence of factors brought about an increased emphasis
on enforcement at EPA. A new, more activist administration took over
the leadership of the Agency. The statutory compliance deadlines in the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act arrived,8 leaving thousands of
major souces of air and water pollution in violation of statutory require-
ments.9 Moreover, the congressional hearings on the reauthorization of
those statutes in 1976 and 1977 made it clear that Congress was impa-
tient with EPA's passive approach to enforcement and compliance dead-
lines. Finally, EPA and the Department of Justice began to budget
increased resources for enforcement.
6. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court held that federal common law applied to disputes involving "air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects." Nearly a decade later, the Court decided that the enactment of
the Clean Water Act, and enforcement action under it had extinguished the need for a federal
common law of nuisance in the water pollution field. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981).
7. The Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.), is a law originally enacted in the nineteenth century which makes illegal
the discharge of almost any material into a navigable waterway. Given its expansive wording,
the Refuse Act has the virtue of encompassing nearly all discharges, making violations gener-
ally clear-cut and relatively easy to establish. The Department of Justice's use of the Refuse
Act expanded what was historically believed to be the Act's scope. See, e.g., United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974) (Refuse Act utilized to prohibit industrial
waste from being discharged into Lake Superior, despite company's possession of a state per-
mit authorizing discharge under certain conditions). This approach formed the basis for many
later theories of environmental enforcement. See Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of
Environmental Wrongs, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 10,065, 10,066-67 (1985); Tripp
& Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALB. L. REv. 60 (1970).
A Refuse Act prosecution program in the United States Attorney's Office for the South-
ern District of New York in 1970 utilized multiple count indictments and grand juries to indict
industrial wastewater discharges. Targets were selected on the basis of the probable harm
from their discharges and their lack of compliance with standards. The program resulted in a
dramatic improvement in water quality in the Hudson River Basin and provided a model for
later enforcement efforts. See Riesel, supra, at 10,067 n. 17.
The Refuse Act still retains some vitality. The Department of Justice's "Indictments and
Convictions" report for fiscal year 1985, for example, shows five convictions under the Act.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments and Convictions, Fiscal Year 1985 (unpublished internal
annual statistical report) (copy on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office). See infra
note 32 for a summary of such figures from 1983-1986.
8. For example, the Clean Water Act contained a July 1, 1977 deadline for attaining
levels which would meet the best practicable technology (BPT) standards for industrial dis-
charges. CWA § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982). The Clean Air Act had similar deadlines for
criteria pollutants such as particulate matter. See, e.g., CAA § 14, 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (1982).
9. Failure to meet these deadlines was widespread and the state and federal governments
mobilized massive resources to bring polluters into compliance.
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To address the enforcement dilemma, EPA adopted its Major
Source Enforcement Effort (MSEE), a program under which it sought to
bring all major violating sources into compliance with the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act. The underlying philosophy of the MSEE pro-
gram was to divide responsibility with the states and to bring as many
civil judicial enforcement actions as possible, in order to deter future vio-
lations and obtain expeditious compliance with environmental statutes
and regulations. In these actions the government sought civil penalties to
punish past noncompliance and to remove the competitive advantage and
economic incentive realized when an entity or individual disregarded the
requirements of environmental statutes. The government's ability to re-
quest injunctive relief was facilitated by the fact that many violations
could be proved by reports required to be filed by the polluters them-
selves. Since the statutes contain no scienter requirements for civil en-
forcement, not surprisingly the government opted primarily for civil
prosecutions. 1o
B. Criminal Enforcement
Initially, criminal enforcement was completely derivative of the civil
enforcement effort. As discussed above, the primary focus under the
government's MSEE strategy was on obtaining compliance as quickly as
possible from as many sources as possible." Resources had been budg-
eted only for civil enforcement cases. Utilization of those resources to
support criminal prosecutions knocked a hole in regional EPA budgets
and upset the MSEE strategy by reducing the number of civil cases
which could be brought.
In the MSEE phase, EPA measured success quantitatively. The rel-
atively greater public visibility and deterrent value of criminal prosecu-
tions were not persuasive in a program whose success was evaluated by
the percentage of violators brought into compliance. Moreover, criminal
prosecution was within the province of the United States Attorney and
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. Criminal environmen-
tal cases were not a priority of those entities nor of the Federal Bureau of
10. According to internal statistics from its Environmental Enforcement Section, the De-
partment of Justice filed 358 civil enforcement suits on behalf of EPA from 1977 to 1980.
During the same period it negotiated more than 77 civil judicial consent decrees requiring
compliance with the applicable statutory and regulatory scheme. From 1981 to 1985 the gov-
ernment filed 852 civil enforcement actions and entered into 599 judicial consent decrees. Tel-
ephone interview with David Buente, Chief, Envtl. Enforcement Section, Land & Natural
Resources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 14, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Buente Telephone
Interview].
11. See supra text preceding note 10.
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Investigation, the primary general investigative law enforcement agency
which works hand in glove with local United States Attorneys in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.'2
The absence of a focused criminal enforcement program resulted in
the development of criminal cases largely by happenstance: When com-
pliance efforts revealed particularly outrageous or especially culpable be-
havior; when the entity involved declined to cooperate; or when the
circumstances aroused unusual vigilance on the part of enforcement au-
thorities.' 3 Interagency tensions developed because of this difference in
approaches: In some cases EPA would refer cases to Department of Jus-
tice as civil matters only to have the Department of Justice deem them as
criminal matters. This forced EPA to devote its scarce resources to sup-
porting a complex criminal investigation and prosecution when it be-
lieved that greater compliance would be achieved by focusing on more
easily documented, less resource-intensive civil actions. The result was
few EPA criminal referrals to the Department of Justice, poor quality
and quantity of technical support for such referrals, and little criminal
enforcement.
Even while it lacked the resources to undertake a meaningful crimi-
nal program, the government did recognize the necessity of a criminal
component in its enforcement program. On June 16, 1976, prompted
largely by a perceived need to press for criminal sanctions in enforcing
the Clean Air Act, EPA issued the first extensive Agency guidelines for
proceeding in criminal cases' 4 and acknowledged the need for greater
vigor in the pursuit of such sanctions. 5 However, the existing inspectors
12. To illustrate how the lack of investigative resources hampered criminal enforcement in
this period, in one case during Mr. Ramsey's tenure at the Department of Justice, an Assistant
United States Attorney investigating possible interstate movement of hazardous materials was
forced to rely on two EPA technicians trailing a tanker truck in their own car.
One reason for this investigative problem is that the FBI jealously guards its role as the
Nation's criminal law enforcement agency and resists the development of criminal enforce-
ment capacities at other federal agencies. The Department of Justice similarly insists that it
should be the government's lawyer, rather than encouraging procedures that would permit
federal agencies such as EPA to bring criminal enforcement actions on its own.
13. One prominent example is a situation which involved mushroom growers in Chester
County, Pennsylvania. The mushroom processors deliberately channelled sewage into a creek
and ignored repeated warnings from state and county officials. Criminal charges were brought
because of the egregiousness of the violations, the obvious intent of the parties to conceal their
illegal acts and the dedication of a county employee who was the government's primary inves-
tigator. See United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa.
1980); see also United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602
F.2d 1129 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
14. See Office of Criminal Enforcement, Envtl. Protection Agency, Criminal Enforcement
Strategy (Draft 1985) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Enforcement Strategy].
15. Id. at 8.
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and investigators were technically oriented persons whose focus was to
bring violators into compliance through cooperation and negotiation.
They were not trained criminal investigators and were not comfortable
with the notion that air and water pollution could be another type of
"white collar" crime.
Nonetheless, the Carter Administration early identified criminal en-
forcement as an area worthy of attention. In 1978, James W. Mooreman,
Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department's Land and Natu-
ral Resources Division, decried the willful violations of environmental
laws which EPA's increased facility inspections were uncovering, and
stated: "For these transgressions, the Department of Justice has begun
to invoke grand jury investigations both against corporations and against
individuals. The Department will prosecute criminal conduct in this
area."
16
The increased emphasis on criminal sanctions, at least at a political
level, dovetailed with the efforts of the Department of Justice and EPA in
attacking the issue of cleanup of hazardous waste disposal in the United
States. In 1978, EPA and the Department of Justice formed a Hazard-
ous Waste Task Force which initiated fifty-two civil actions, utilizing
common law nuisance theories and the endangerment provisions of sec-
tion 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).
17
These civil actions revealed the potential severity of the environmental
danger resulting from unscrupulous operators' illegal disposal of hazard-
ous waste. The increased public and congressional awareness of this
problem's scope placed additional pressure on the Justice Department
and EPA to focus attention and resources on criminal enforcement. Sev-
eral cases decided in this period illustrated the deterrent value served by
seeking and obtaining jail sentences rather than civil injunctions. The
criminal prosecutions of Donald Distler for disposing pesticide wastes
into the Louisville, Kentucky sewer system 8 and of Robert Earl Ward
and Robert Burns for their part in dumping waste oil laden with
polychlorinated biphenols (PCBs) along a North Carolina roadside 19
16. Speech by James W. Mooreman, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., American Law Insti-
tute-American Bar Association Conference, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 1978).
17. RCRA § 7003, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6973 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
18. United States v. Distler, 9 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,700 (W.D. Ky. 1979)
(conviction of individual for illegally discharging pesticide wastes into Louisville sewer system,
disrupting major portion of system), aff'd, 671 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827
(1981).
19. United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.) (conviction of individual for illegal
dumping of PCBs along roadsides in North Carolina affirmed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835
(1982).
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demonstrated the need for expending additional resources in criminal
enforcement.2'
Even without budgeted resources, the government began to increase
the number of criminal prosecutions. Despite the notoriety of hazardous
waste cases, the absence of trained investigators and technical support
staff meant that the bulk of early criminal enforcement efforts was de-
voted to Clean Water Act cases involving discharge monitoring reports
which had been falsely certified, or other "false statement on paper" re-
lated cases.21 Not suprisingly, given this selection process, the govern-
ment was generally successful in its legal actions.22
In the closing months of the Carter Administration, Justice Depart-
ment officials began to lay the groundwork to gain public support for
increased criminal enforcement. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti
told a graduating class at Michigan Law School of the need for criminal
prosecutions of environmental violators:
I propose that we put less emphasis as a society on the writing
20. Perhaps an even greater example to environmental regulators of the need for trained
and experienced criminal investigators was the unsuccessful prosecution of Velsicol Chemical
Corp. and its employees for alleged environmental violations. These federal indictments were
ultimately invalidated because of improprieties in the grand jury proceedings. United States v.
Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
21. See, ag., United States v. Distler, 9 ENvTL. L. R P. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,700 (W.D.
Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.) (suit for dumping chemicals causing upset of publicly
owned treatment work), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F.
Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (conviction of corporation and corporate employees for false
reporting under Clean Water Act); United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (suit against mushroom growers for discharges under Clean Water Act without permit),
aff'd, 602 F.2d 1129 (3d Cir. 1979) (remanded for further proceedings to determine whether
defendant's activity was within purview of regulations), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980);
United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Ariz. 1975) (discharge without
permit, establishing broad definition of navigable waters).
22. See, eg., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (dismissal of
criminal indictment under Clean Air Act reversed); United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th
Cir.) (convictions for violation of regulations controlling PCBs resulting in fine of $200,000
and 2-1/2 year prison term affirmed), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States v. Wes-
Con, Inc., Cr. No. 80-10040 (D. Idaho Jan. 16, 1981) (conviction of corporation for violation
of PCB disposal regulations and false reporting); United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom
Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (motions to dismiss indictments denied); United
States v. Distler, 9 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 20,700 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671
F.2d 954 (6th Cir.) (suit for dumping chemicals causing upset of publicly owned treatment
work), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (sewer committee guilty of making false statements under CWA
§ 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)); United States v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1444 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (court denied motions to dismiss criminal indictments under
CWA § 309(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3)); United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir.
1977) (conviction of individual for knowingly discharging gasoline in violation of Clean Water
Act, affirmed).
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of additional government regulations and the spending of more
tax moneys, and that we place more emphasis on the simple
enforcement of existing laws and regulations and on the main-
tenance and operation of the present pollution control
equipment.
In one area in particular, stronger enforcement is neces-
sary now to protect the public. It is an area where the regula-
tory scheme is not only undeveloped; it has not even taken
effect. I refer to toxic and hazardous wastes.23
Civiletti emphasized individual criminal responsibility for corporate acts
and pledged to prosecute corporate officials in order to realize maximum
deterrence to the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes.24 In 1980, the
Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice cre-
ated a new Environmental Enforcement Section. The Division listed
criminal enforcement as its number one priority.25
To begin implementation of the criminal enforcement program at
EPA, a Department of Justice attorney, Peter Beeson, was assigned to
EPA at the end of the Carter Administration to develop a formal crimi-
nal enforcement program. This led to the creation of the Office of Crimi-
nal Enforcement, with Beeson as its director, on January 5, 1981.26 Its
charge was to implement the Agency's commitment "actively to pursue
criminal sanctions, where appropriate, to enhance the effectiveness of the
enforcement program."27 In October 1982, the first criminal investiga-
tors were hired at EPA. Most of these investigators initially came from
metropolitan police departments or other federal law enforcement agen-
cies; none had environmental backgrounds.28 Simultaneously with
EPA's formation of a criminal enforcement office, the Land and Natural
Resources Division of the Department of Justice set up within its Envi-
ronmental Enforcement Section a special unit whose sole responsibility
was investigation and enforcement of environmental crimes. The new
23. Address by Benjamin Civiletti, U.S. Attorney Gen., Michigan Law School Graduation
Exercises (May 17, 1980).
24. Id.
25. J. TOMPKINS, JR., OFFICE OF POLICY & MGMT. ANALYSIS, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1980).
26. See Criminal Enforcement Strategy, supra note 14, at 8.
27. B. Blum, Creation of the Office of Criminal Enforcement 1 (unpublished EPA internal
memorandum) (Jan. 5, 1981).
28. Criminal Enforcement Strategy, supra note 14, at 9. EPA now has an "ambitious
training program" for its investigators, drawing on other expert sources in law enforcement
and environmental technology, and plans to expand its efforts. Id. at 6-7.
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Environmental Crimes Unit, headed by Judson Starr, accepted referrals
from EPA and supervised prosecution of environmental criminal cases.
As these programs took shape, criminal enforcement continued to
focus upon activities causing serious environmental harm especially
where there was clear recalcitrance on the part of the alleged violator, or
where clearly false statements were made in violation of the reporting
sections of the statutes. In short, criminal enforcement was viewed as
reaching the more obvious or egregious violations, with additional or
more stringent sanctions sought against violators whose conduct seemed
especially culpable.2 9
This limited focus began to change as congressional pressure-and
EPA's own recognition of the deterrent value of criminal enforcement in
encouraging voluntary compliance-led to a more active and broad-
based criminal program. Media attention to incidents such as the explo-
sion of the Louisville, Kentucky sewer system under a major roadway
which resulted from Ralston Purina Company's illegal discharge of hex-
ane into the sewers,3" alerted the public to the imminence and enormity
of the potential for lethal results from illegal disposal of chemicals and
hazardous waste, and to the corresponding need for protection through
deterrence. Increasingly greater resources were devoted to this area31
and the pace of criminal enforcement in hazardous waste violations has
accelerated ever since.32
29. B. Blum, supra note 27, at 2-3. See also C. Price, Policy and Procedures on Parallel
Proceedings at the Environmental Protection Agency 3 (unpublished EPA internal memoran-
dum) (Jan. 23, 1984) ("In light of the limited criminal investigative resources available to the
Agency, criminal investigations and referrals are necessarily limited to situations of the most
significant and/or flagrant environmental misconduct.").
30. United States v. Ralston Purina Co., 12 ENVTL. L. RP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 2057
(W.D. Ky. 1982). The Ralston Purina Co., which manufactures breakfast cereals and pet
foods, used hexane, a highly flammable waste, in its soybean extraction plant in Louisville,
Kentucky. The hexane released into the city sewer lines resulted in a huge explosion under a
major arterial roadway (fortunately at 5:00 a.m.), causing millions of dollars of damage.
The Louisville sewer district has had more than its share of environmental damage; it was
also the victim in United States v. Distler, 9 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,700 (W.D.
Ky. 1979) (pesticide wastes illegally disposed of in sewers, disrupting major portion of system),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981). At least in the Distler case,
the sewer district was able to recoup the remainder of its damage and recovery expenses under
its insurance policy. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
753 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1985) (damage covered by "vandalism and malicious mischief" provi-
sion of insurance policy).
31. By early 1985, EPA had a staff of 20 trained criminal investigators who were author-
ized to carry firearms. Comment, Marking Time: A Status Report on the Clean Air Act Be-
tween Deadlines, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,022, 10,038 (1985).
32. Accordingly to the Department of Justice's internal Indictment and Convictions up-
dates, from the beginning of Fiscal Year 1983 to February 14, 1986, the Environmental Crimes
Unit received 220 referrals which resulted in 252 indictments and 211 pleas and convictions.
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Compliance and cleanup through civil enforcement remain the main
Envtl. Enforcement Section, Land & Natural Resources Div.; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indict-
ments and Convictions, Fiscal Year 1986; Envt'l Enforcement Section, Land & Natural Re-
sources Div.; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments and Convictions, Fiscal Year 1985; Envt'l
Enforcement Section, Land & Natural Resources Div.; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments and
Convictions, Fiscal Year 1984; Envt'l Enforcement Section, Land & Natural Resources Div.;
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments and Convictions, Fiscal Year 1983 (unpublished internal
annual statistical summaries) (copies on file at Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office) [here-
inafter cumulatively cited together as Indictments & Convictions 1983-86]. A total of
$1,778,090 in fines was assessed. A total of 87 years, 9 months in jail terms was imposed with
most jail time suspended in favor of probationary terms and conditions. And defendants actu-
ally served 10 years, 4 months, 10 days in confinement. Id.
SUMMARY
Referrals Indictments Pleas/Convictions
Fiscal year 1983 26 40 40
Fiscal year 1984 37 43 32
Fiscal year 1985 51 40 37
Fiscal year 1986 112 129 102
TOTAL 226 252 211
Fines Actual
Imposed Jail Terms Confinement
Fiscal Year 1983 $ 341,100 11 yrs. 5 yrs.
Fiscal Year 1984 $ 384,290 5 yrs. 3 mos. I yr. 7 mos.
Fiscal Year 1985 $ 565,850 5 yrs. 5 mos. 2 yrs. I1 mos.
Fiscal Year 1986 $ 486,800 66 yrs. 1 mo. - 8.3 mos.
TOTAL $1,778,040 87 yrs. 9 mos. 10 yrs. 4.3 mos.
As this Summary shows, enforcement has become more active and effective with each suc-
ceeding year.
The authors' survey of the convictions which were reported in detail by the Department
of Justice in fiscal years 1983-1986 showed the character of enforcement more clearly:
Corporations Individuals Totals
Convictions 37 69 105
Fines, sanctions imposed 34 53 86
Probation imposed 3 39 42
Restitution, cleanup work ordered 5 5 10
"Alternative" sentencing imposed (community service,
trust funds, etc.) 3 20 23
Jail Time - 17 17
In addition to the cases sumamrized, in one large series of cases involving pesticide use, 76
individual farmers pled guilty and paid fines of $500 each, for a total of $38,000.
Criminal enforcement actions were brought under or involved various provisions of the
following legislation: CWA, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)); RCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2798
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6987 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985)); Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1977) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982)); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No.
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priorities of EPA, but deterrence through criminal prosecution has also
become an important policy goal of enforcement efforts. Consistent with
Attorney General Civiletti's early statement of governmental policy,
33
the general approach which has developed in EPA and the Department
of Justice criminal enforcement units not only is to pursue corporations
but, increasingly, to seek indictments against individuals within corpora-
tions who might be personally culpable. The reasoning behind this is
straightforward and obvious: individuals commit crimes, corporations
do not. Corporations in many cases may not feel the sting of fines as
smartly as would individuals, since in the case of significant operations
even sizable fines may be viewed as "a cost of doing business." More-
over, as incorporeal entities, corporations themselves cannot go to jail.
The deterrent effect of the environmental statutes is enhanced, enforce-
ment authorities have concluded, if responsible individuals within the
corporation know they may not sanction or participate in illegal activity
without subjecting themselves personally to the possibility of substantial
fines and/or imprisonment.
In addition, greater enforcement efforts-particularly against indi-
viduals-reflect a general principle that criminal law should apply
equally to the corporate world as to street crime and other more familiar
legal contexts. A failure to enforce environmental criminal statutes is
perceived as breeding disrespect for law enforcement in general.
At this time, the criminal enforcement program has moved beyond
the "experimental" stage. It has been institutionalized within EPA and
the Department of Justice and these agencies have developed fairly well-
established criteria and procedures for case selection and prosecution.
From an ad hoc program with one attorney serving both as its Director
and Staff, the Office of Criminal Enforcement has expanded dramatically.
92-516, 86 Stat. 975 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982)); Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat.
2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, 42, 49 U.S.C.); Refuse Act of 1899
§§ 13, 16, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended in 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1982));
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act § 105, 49 U.S.C. § 1804 (1982). In addition, the
circumstances of several cases permitted invocation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act § 2, 16
U.S.C. § 703 (1982). Only one successful prosecution was reported under the CAA, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp.
I 1983)), in this period. The case resulted in the convictions of a company and three individu-
als. Indictments were returned, however, in one other Clean Air Act action. Indictments &
Convictions 1983-86, supra note 32.
General criminal statutes employed included: 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (crime against the
United States); id. § 287 (false claim); id. § 371 (conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
United States); id. § 641 (conversion of government property); id. § 1001 (false statement); id.
§§ 1341, 1343 (mail fraud).
33. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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The Office of Criminal Enforcement, headquartered in Washington,
D.C., is responsible for policy development, program guidance and liai-
son with the Department of Justice and regional EPA offices. The inves-
tigators are now located in all ten regional EPA offices and are managed
through the National Enforcement Investigation Center (NEIC) in Den-
ver, Colorado. Investigators work directly with United States Attorneys'
offices and have law enforcement authority as deputized United States
Marshals.3" Budgeted resources for criminal investigation and prosecu-
tion support, together with recognition of criminal enforcement as an
Agency priority in the internal management arguments and workload
models, ultimately drive governmental resource allocation decisions.
In short, criminal enforcement is now recognized not only as good
government but also as good politics. The Agency has taken most, if not
all, of the steps necessary to insure a modicum of support for and recog-
nition of criminal enforcement as a priority. Nonetheless, investigative
and prosecutorial resources are still limited and criminal prosecutions
must compete with civil enforcement matters for scarce resources, which
means that the number and complexity of criminal cases that can be han-
dled is severely constrained.35 However, in all, the future of criminal
enforcement seems assured, at least on a limited level. Its impact, even
with limited resources, cannot be ignored or denied.
34. As deputized marshals, investigators have authority to carry firearms and execute
search and arrest warrants. This additional authority was provided only after an extensive
debate within the Reagan Administration and congressional hearings which were critical of
the Attorney General's failure to grant law enforcement authority to EPA's investigative staff.
Letter from Benjamin Civiletti, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Douglas M. Costle, Adm'r (Jan. 16,
1981).
The FBI has also joined in support of environmental prosecutions. A 1982 memorandum
of understanding between EPA and the FBI committed the FBI to investigate 30 cases per
year upon request from EPA.
35. One indication that budgetary constraints limit prosecution of complex cases is the
authors' survey of convictions which showed the following:
Fines or $100- $5,001- $10,001- $25,001- $50,001-
Penalties $5,000 $10,000 $25,000 $50,000 $100,000 $100,000
77 40 11 22 11 3 1
Indictments & Convictions 1983-86, supra note 32 (In computing the total number of "fines or
penalties," the authors combined multiple fines assessed against a single corporation or indi-
vidual into one total, and did not count portions of fines that were "suspended" pending com-
munity service or other alternative sentencing.). This pattern reflects a continuing concern
with compliance and cleanup-rather than punishment-as priorities, and a focus, albeit
somewhat lessened, on reporting or discharge limits violations. Reporting and discharge limits
violations are easier to investigate and prove, but tend to result in less significant penalties.
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II. LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
Criminal enforcement in the area of environmental protection is
based on a myriad of often overlapping, sometimes confusing statutory
provisions. These include criminal sanctions specified in environmental
statutes, as well as the application of general criminal statutes to environ-
mental violators.
1. Environmental statutory provisions
Most environmental statutes contain criminal sanctions, consistent
with Congress' and EPA's recognition that such sanctions provide an
increased deterrent effect and greatly enhance voluntary compliance with
civil provisions. These statutes are generally characterized by a scienter
requirement and by substantial penalties designed to ensure that non-
compliance is economically unattractive.
Sections 309(c) and 31 l(b)(5) of the Clean Water Act specify crimi-
nal sanctions for willful or negligent conduct by any "person" for violat-
ing certain Clean Water Act provisions,36 for knowingly making a false
statement, 7 or for failing to notify EPA of discharges of oil or other
hazardous substances.3 8 Section 309(c)(3) adds "responsible corporate
officer" to the definition of "person" for criminal violations.3 9 Violations
are classified as misdemeanors, with fines for willful or negligent conduct
set at $2500 to $25,000 per day of violation and/or one year of imprison-
ment.' Subsequent offenses may result in the imposition of fines of up to
$50,000 and/or two years imprisonment per violation.4' False reporting
under section 309(c)(2) is punishable by a fine of $10,000 and/or six
months imprisonment.42 Failure to notify the appropriate government
agency of a discharge is punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and/or one
year imprisonment per violation.43
Section 113(c) of the Clean Air Act provides sanctions for "know-
36. CWA § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).
37. Id. § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1982).
38. Id. § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1982).
39. Id. § 309(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1982).
40. Id. § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1982). This provision should not be confused
with 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (providing for criminal penalties for willfully supplying false
information to any United States department or agency). See infra text accompanying notes
84-87 for discussion.
43. CWA § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1982).
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ing" violations of the Act by any "person,"' which includes "responsible
corporate officer."45 Violations are misdemeanors and can result in fines
of up to $25,000 per day of violation and/or one year imprisonment for
substantive violations.46 Subsequent violations are subject to fines up to
$50,000 per day of violation and/or two years imprisonment. 47 Again,
false reporting violations incur a lesser penalty, up to $10,000 and/or six
months imprisonment per violation.48
Section 3008(d) of RCRA49 contains sanctions for "knowingly"
conducting any prohibited act, such as transporting hazardous waste to
an unpermitted facility, 0 treating, storing or disposing of hazardous
waste without obtaining a permit to do so or in violation of such per-
mit;5 making a false statement in a document;5" destruction, alteration
or concealment of documents required to be maintained under RCRA; 3
transportation without a manifest;54 and improper foreign export of haz-
ardous materials. 5 The criminal penalty imposed for violating any of
these RCRA provisions is a fine of up to $50,000 per day of violation
and/or two years imprisonment. 6 However, stiffer jail terms of up to
five years are authorized for transporting hazardous waste to an unper-
mitted facility57 and for treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste
without a permit. 8 Additionally, penalties for subsequent RCRA con-
victions are mandatorily doubled.59
Section 3008(e) of RCRA specifically prohibits the handling of any
hazardous waste in a manner which "places another person in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury."6 The penalty for individuals
convicted under this "knowing endangerment" provision is substantial:
the imposition of a fine of up to $250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to
44. CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982).
45. Id. § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982); see also id. § 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e)
(1982).
46. Id. § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 113(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2) (1982).
49. RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West Supp. 1985).
50. Id. § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
51. Id. § 3008(d)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
52. Id. § 3008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
53. Id. § 3008(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(4) (West Supp. 1985).
54. Id. § 3008(d)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985).
55. Id. § 3008(d)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(6) (West Supp. 1985).
56. Id. § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West Supp. 1985).
57. Id. § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
58. Id. § 3008(d)(2)(A)-(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(2)(A)-(C) (West Supp. 1985).
59. Id. § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (West Supp. 1985).
60. Id. § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(e) (West Supp. 1985).
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fifteen years.6 1 Organizations convicted under the provision are subject
to a fine of up to $1,000,000.62
Section 16(a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) imposes
sanctions for knowingly or willfully committing any of the acts prohib-
ited by section 15 of TSCA6' and imposes penalties of up to $25,000 and/
or one year imprisonment per violation in addition to any civil
penalties."
Section 14(b) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) provides that FIFRA violations are misdemeanors punish-
able by fines of up to $25,000 and/or one year imprisonment per viola-
tion,65 unless the violation is by a private applicator, in which case
sanctions may not exceed $1000 and/or thirty days imprisonment.
66
Disclosure of information protected by section 3 of FIFRA is punishable
by fines of up to $10,000 and/or three years imprisonment. 7 In addi-
tion, FIFRA contains a special provision which imputes to corporate of-
ficers and agents individual responsibility for the actions of all
employees, agents or officers taken on behalf of the corporation.
6 8
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA),69 commonly known as "Superfund," also con-
tains a number of criminal sanction provisions. Section 103 requires im-
mediate notification of the release of hazardous substances to the
appropriate federal agency.7" Strict liability is imposed for failure of any
person or persons in charge of a vessel or facility to provide immediate
notification as soon as that person has knowledge of the release.71 For
these purposes "person" is defined in section 101(21) to include individu-
61. Id.
62. Id. Section 3008(0 of RCRA provides a special definition of "knowing" for determin-
ing liability under the knowing endangerment provision. RCRA § 3008(0, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(0. For a detailed discussion of the "knowing" element, see infra note 125.
63. TSCA § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 2614 (1982).
64. Id. § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94
(4th Cir. 1982) (conviction under TSCA for unlawful disposal of toxic substances and aiding
and abetting the disposal of toxic substances of individuals who conspired to dump and
dumped oil along roadways in North Carolina).
65. FIFRA § 14(b)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1982).
66. Id. § 14(b)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(2) (1982) (defining a "private applicator" as a person
who is certified to use or supervise the use of a restricted pesticide on his own or his employer's
property without compensation other than for personal services).
67. Id. § 14(b)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(3) (1982).
68. Id. § 14(b)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(4) (1982).
69. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 26, 33, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
70. Id. §§ 103(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a)-(b) (1982).
71. Id. § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1982).
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als, firms, corporations, associations, partnerships, consortiums, joint
ventures or commercial entities.7 2 Penalties for these provisions are up
to $10,000 and/or one year imprisonment.73 A further deterrent is that a
substantive conviction also strips the person of defenses or liability limi-
tations provided in section 107 of CERCLA 4 in cost recovery actions.7 5
Section 103(c) of CERCLA76 requires notification to EPA, within
specified time limits, of the existence of any facility at which hazardous
wastes are or were treated, stored and disposed of by any person who
now owns or operates, or at the time of disposal owned or operated, or
accepted for transportation to and selected the facility, unless the facility
is within the exemptions set out in the statute. Knowing failure to com-
ply with this provision can result in penalties of up to $10,000 and im-
prisonment for up to one year. 7
The Refuse Act78 is a nineteenth century statute which essentially
prohibits discharges of almost any pollutant into navigable waters. Vio-
lations are punishable by fines of up to $2500 or imprisonment for up to
one year.79
Environmental statutes in many states provide for criminal sanc-
tions under a variety of circumstances and specify substantial penaltiesY0
These statutes or regulations are often modeled after federal provisions,
particularly in states which are operating environmental enforcement
programs "in lieu of" federal enforcement of RCRA.8 In some cases,
however, state regulations may differ from or go beyond the types of con-
72. Id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982).
73. Id. § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1982).
74. Id. § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
75. Id. § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1982). "In addition, any such person who know-
ingly fails to provide the notice required by this subsection shall not be entitled to any limita-
tion of liability or to any defenses to liability set out in section 9607 of this title .... " Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The Refuse Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 33 U.S.C.). See supra note 7 and accompanying text for an historical discussion of
the Refuse Act.
79. Id. § 16, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
80. A discussion of the various, intricate state criminal environmental laws is beyond the
scope of this Article. Practitioners, however, must be alert to the interrelationship between
state and federal environmental regulations. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text for
a limited discussion of parallel state and federal environmental proceedings.
81. RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6926(b) (West Supp. 1985). As with other environmen-
tal statutes, states have primary responsibility for enforcement under the RCRA. Before EPA
can delegate enforcement under RCRA, states must "provide adequate enforcement of compli-
ance" with federal requirements. Id. See Requirements for Authorization of State Hazardous
Waste Programs, 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(a)(3)(ii) (1985).
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duct sanctioned by federal statutory provisions."2
2. Non-environmental criminal statutes
In addition to the specific environmental provisions discussed above,
federal environmental authorities have available to them the usual pano-
ply of general criminal statutes and sanctions. Conduct or facts in a
particular case may lead authorities to invoke any of a wide variety of
general criminal provisions, usually in conjunction with specific environ-
mental statutes.8 3
In 18 U.S.C. § 1001,84 criminal penalties are available for a wide
range of false statements made to government, in contrast with and in
addition to liability for submitting false reports under the environmental
statutes."5 Liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for violating section
309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act,8 6 for example, attaches only for falsifi-
cation of those records specifically required by the Clean Water Act.8 7
Such statements need not have been made under oath or in writing, so
that statements made in the course of investigation potentially may raise
liability. To be within the statute's purview, the statements must involve
matters within the jurisdiction of the particular federal agency and rise to
the level of knowing and willful falsification or concealment by trick,
scheme or device, including fraudulent representations. 8 Penalties of up
to $10,000 and/or five years imprisonment may be invoked. 9
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes can be invoked to reach any
scheme where either the mail or interstate wires or airwaves are used in
furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain property or
money by false representations. 90 The statutes provide penalties of up to
$10,000 and/or five years imprisonment. 91
The federal obstruction of justice provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, pro-
hibits the intimidation of witnesses or obstruction of the administration
82. See supra note 80.
83. See supra note 32.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Oulette, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350 (E.D. Ark. 1977)
(citing CWA § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1982) (establishing a public welfare offense
for which proof of specific criminal intent is not required)).
86. CWA § 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1982).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (fraud by wire, radio or television).
See, e.g., United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (Mail Fraud Act used to
indict chemical manufacturer and its officers for making false representations to EPA).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
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of justice by corrupt or threatening conduct or communications. 92 One
potential area of liability in the criminal environmental context under
this statute is the employment relationship between a corporation and its
"informer" employees.93 The penalties provided are up to $5000 in fines
and/or imprisonment of not more than five years. 94 A related obstruc-
tion of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1505, 91 provides similar penalties for
acts interfering with a witness in any proceeding pending before any
United States department or agency.
Aiding and abetting a criminal act can be charged,96 particularly
when liability against individuals for corporate acts is sought. 97 Conspir-
acy to defraud charges might be employed for conduct which attempts to
willfully circumvent agency regulations. 98 Perjury charges may be in-
voked against any witness who, while testifying under oath before a com-
petent tribunal, willfully and contrary to such oath, states or subscribes
to any material which the witness does not believe to be true.99 A per-
jury conviction subjects the violator to a fine of up to $2000 or imprison-
ment of five years, or both.l"o A criminal contempt provision specifically
addressed to hazardous waste matters1° may be relevant when existing
consent decrees are violated or when subpoenaed witnesses fail to appear.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act 10 2 makes it illegal to ac-
quire, maintain or control any enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.103 The use of RICO to prosecute enterprises organized for
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1982).
93. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of employer-employee
conflicts of interest associated with criminal enforcement actions.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
95. Id. § 1505.
96. Id. § 2. See, eg., United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.) (aiding and abetting
unlawful disposal of toxic substances under TSCA), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
97. See, eg., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985). In Johnson & Towers, a chemical company foreman and truck-
ing supervisor observed hazardous waste being pumped into a ditch which fed into a creek. Id.
at 664. The trial court found that these individuals did not violate RCRA § 3008(d)(2)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text, since that provision
applies only to "owners and operators." 741 F.2d at 664. Nonetheless, the trial court held
they could be found liable for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal,
§ 3008(d)(2)(A) of the RCRA ultimately was held to apply to "employees," in addition to
"owners and operators." 741 F.2d at 664-65.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982).
100. Id.
101. Federal Hazardous Substances Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 1267 (1982).
102. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
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illegal purposes has been upheld, which greatly expands the statute's
scope. 1" Although there are no reported prosecutions in the environ-
mental area under RICO, the federal statutes offer prosecutors an attrac-
tive combination of criminal and civil penalties1"5 and a possible
alternative when statutes of limitations on underlying offenses have
run. 106
. Standards of Liability
When governmental authorities do invoke these various criminal
provisions, they have powerful environmental enforcement tools at their
disposal. Environmental statutes are within the class of laws established
to protect the public welfare. 10 7 In contrast to most criminal statutes,
the standard of criminal environmental liability is less stringent, reflect-
ing the legislative concern for protecting the important public interest in
environmental safety. 108 Accordingly, they could be liberally read to im-
pose criminal liability without any requirement of intent.109
Most environmental statutes, however, attach criminal liability on a
showing of "knowing" or "willful" violation of the applicable acts' re-
quirements. '10 This does not imply a strict standard of intent or deliber-
104. See, eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985) (citing United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981)); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE VIOLATIONS:
A GUIDE TO THEIR DETECTION, INVESTIGATION, AND PROSECUTION 15-18 (1981).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (criminal penalties); id. § 1964 (civil remedies).
106. RICO has no express statute of limitations provision. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3282, how-
ever, a five year statute of limitations is applicable to criminal statutes which do not have
express limitations provisions. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982). To be criminally convicted under
RICO, at least two acts of racketeering activity must be established; the last such activity must
have occurred within 10 years of the most recent activity. Thus, RICO prosecutions are viable
so long as the most recent racketeering activity occurred within five years prior to the indict-
ment and at least one other act occurred within 10 years of the most recent. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1)(A)(5) (1982). See United States v. Revel, 493 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (federal anti-
racketeering prosecution permissible even when statute of limitations on underlying state of-
fense has run), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 478-
80 (D. Del. 1980) (although five year statute of limitations had expired on underlying allega-
tions of mail fraud, the acts would still be used as predicate acts in RICO prosecution to satisfy
statute of limitations).
107. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985); see infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text for discussion.
108. A full analysis of the standards of criminal liability under environmental statutes is
outside the focus of this Article. For a detailed discussion, see generally Riesel, supra note 7,
at 10,071-72.
109. Id. at 668 (citing United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1922)).
110. See, e.g., FIFRA § 14, 7 U.S.C. 136(1) (1982) (knowing); TSCA § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b) (1982) (knowing or willful); RCRA § 3008(d)-(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)-(e) (West
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ate wrongdoing for criminal liability. In the context of public welfare
statutes, the words "knowingly" and "willfully" mean either an inten-
tional disregard or "plain indifference" to statutory requirements."
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.," 2 the Third Circuit rec-
onciled the "knowing violation" requirement with the public welfare
character of RCRA.113 The court determined that RCRA could be con-
strued to impose strict liability since the defendant, regardless of whether
he knew of the requirement, was a "person" who handled hazardous
waste without a permit. However, the court determined that the statute
should be construed to require that the individual be aware of the need
for a permit and that the company failed to obtain one. 114 The court
further noted that under appropriate circumstances, a jury could infer
such knowledge for those individuals who hold requisite responsible posi-
tions in the corporation.11
The public welfare character of environmental statutes and their
specific language also combine to produce a mixed standard as to crimi-
nal liability of corporate officers for activities in which they do not di-
rectly participate. In two cases involving the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 16 a public welfare statute, the United States Supreme Court held
that even corporate officials who had no personal involvement in the ille-
gal conduct could be held criminally liable." 7 In United States v. Dot-
terweich, 8 the president of a pharmaceutical company was convicted for
Supp. 1985) (knowing); CWA §§ 309(c), 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1321(b)(5) (1982)
(willful or knowing); CAA § 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (1982) (knowing); CERCLA
§ 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (knowing failure to notify).
111. United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938).
112. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
113. Id. at 667-68 (citing Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3008(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
(1982)).
114. Id. at 667-69.
115. Id. at 669-70. The Johnson & Towers court stated that for some materials "'the
probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them
or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.'" Id. at 669 (quoting
United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (failure to
record chemical shipments)). See also Carolene Prod. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66
(4th Cir.), aff'd, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
One commentator has drawn an analogy between the supervisory liability of corporate
officials under environmental laws and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), in which World
War II Japanese General Tomayuksi Yamashita was found culpably negligent for breaching
an affirmative duty to "discover and control" activities of his troops despite their being spread
over a large area. Yamashita was subsequently hanged. Comment, The Criminal Responsibil-
ity of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALB. L. REV. 61, 74 (1972).
116. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982).
117. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
118. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
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the interstate shipment of adulterated and misbranded drugs, although
the official was not shown to have participated in or even to have known
of the specific transactions, and the corporation itself was acquitted. 119
The Court explained that it was sufficient that he had "a responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws."
' 120
In United States v. Park,'2 ' the president of a large natural food chain
was held liable for causing food adulteration, although responsibility for
the sanitation function had been delegated to other individuals.122 The
Court held that such responsible individuals had a duty to implement
measures to avoid violations and to seek out and remedy violations that
do occur.
123
Moreover, courts seeking to define the standard of liability in this
area have held that under the "responsible corporate officer" theory, cor-
porate officials may be responsible for wrongdoings affecting public
health and welfare if the government can prove that the official was in a
position to seek out, discover and stop the illegal act and failed to do
so. 124 Actual knowledge of the act is not required. The various environ-
mental statutes which expressly hold responsible corporate officials liable
makes this theory easier to apply in criminal enforcement actions.
12
1
119. Id. at 279.
120. Id. at 284.
121. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
122. Id. at 662-63.
123. Id. at 672.
124. See, e.g., United States v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., Cr. No. 82-37-01-L (D.N.H.
Apr. 7, 1983). The doctrine of "the responsible corporate official," as used in criminal cases
involving violations of public health and welfare statutes, had its genesis in Park and Dot-
terweich and was applied in two environmental cases: United States v. Johnson & Towers,
Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985); United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266, 272-73 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
125. See, eg., FIFRA § 14(b)(4), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(4) (1982); CWA § 309(c)(3), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(3) (1982); CAA § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3) (1982). Such express statutory
language for the exception for public welfare laws is critical to application of the responsible
corporate officer theory, otherwise corporate officers are liable only if they authorized, ratified,
participated in or helped perpetrate the crime. United States v. Wisconsin, 370 U.S. 405
(1962). The general rule is:
Officers, directors, or agents of a corporation may be criminally liable individually
for acts done by them in behalf of the corporation. They cannot, in the absence of
statute, be held so liable for acts in which they have not either actively participated, or
which they have not directed or permitted.
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 931 (1940) (emphasis added). RCRA § 3008(0, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6928(0 (West Supp. 1985), provides a specific definition of "knowingly" for purposes of
RCRA's "knowing endangerment" provision, RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(e) (West
Supp. 1985). The section that defines "knowingly" states in pertinent part:
For the purposes of subsection (e) of this section-
(1) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to-
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The statutory standard of liability, then, has been construed essen-
tially as "knew or should have known;" although similar to a negligence
test, it probably requires a more overt or egregious lack of due care simi-
lar to a gross negligence test. Perhaps the most instructive example of
this standard of liability is found in United States v. A. C. Lawrence
Leather Co. 126 The company and five officials were charged with bypas-
sing a wastewater treatment plant and regularly discharging raw, un-
treated wastes into a nearby river and concealing this activity from
EPA. 27 The defendants were also charged with illegally storing hazard-
ous waste, tetraclorethylene, used in Lawrence's leather treatment opera-
tions.128 Although three officials were charged with actually ordering the
bypass, the court, relying on Dotterweich 129 and Park,130 also indicated
the company's president and vice president. It was alleged that, as re-
(A) his conduct, if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or believes that the circum-
stance exists; or
(C) a result of his conduct, if he is aware or believes that his conduct is
substantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(2) In determining whether a defendant who is a natural person knew that his con-
duct placed another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury-
(A) the person is responsible only for actual awareness or actual belief that he
possessed; and
(B) knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant but not by the
defendant himself may not be attributed to the defendant;
Provided, That in proving the defendant's possession of actual knowledge, circum-
stantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative
steps to shield himself from relevant information.
RCRA § 3008(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0.
It is unclear just exactly how the standard of liability under this section may differ from
the general test since, to date, no reported decision has construed RCRA § 3008(0. Section
3008(0(2)(B) suggests, however, that the "responsible corporate official" theory may not be
applicable to § 3008(e) prosecutions. RCRA § 3008(0(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(0(2)(B).
126. Cr. No. 82-37-01-L (D.N.H. Apr. 7, 1983).
127. During the period of time the bypassing was concealed from the authorities, the com-
pany had applied for and was receiving nearly a quarter of a million dollars from EPA, ostensi-
bly to study how effective its wastewater treatment plant could be in removing pollution from
the industrial waste generated by the facility. As a requirement under the grant, the company
was required to file reports to be used to develop pollution standards for the whole leather
tanning industry. Needless to say the bypassing operation rendered useless the information the
government paid for.
128. The indictments alleged violations of the following federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 287
(1982) (false claims); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (false state-
ments); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1982) (mail fraud); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1319(c)(1) (1982)
(Clean Water Act violations);RCRA §§ 211-215, 224(b), 243(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925 (West
Supp. 1985) (operation without RCRA permit); RCRA § 232(c)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(3)
(West Supp. 1985) (RCRA false statement); CERCLA § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1982)
(CERCLA failure to notify).
129. 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
130. 421 U.S. 658 (1975); see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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sponsible corporate officials, they failed to seek out, discover and stop the
practice. The company was convicted after a trial and was fined nearly a
half million dollars; the individuals pled guilty and received probation.131
An exception to this general liability standard is the Clean Water
Act, which imposes criminal liability not only for willful acts, but also
for violations due to simple negligence.132 If the defendant, in the exer-
cise of due care, should have known that his activities were likely to re-
sult in a violation of certain of the Clean Water Act's requirements,
liability attaches.
133
C. Corporate and Individual Responsibility for Criminal Actions
Corporations are considered legal "persons"' 134 and are expressly de-
fined as "persons" for purposes of criminal enforcement of environmen-
tal statutes. 135  Accordingly, when corporate policy diverges from
environmental requirements, the corporation may be criminally liable.136
In addition, corporations may be held liable for actions of their employ-
ees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or agency,
because courts will impute the knowledge of such individuals to the cor-
poration. 137 Acts of commission or omission of even fairly low-level
131. United States v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., Cr. No. 82-37-01-L (D.N.H. Apr. 7,
1983).
132. CWA § 309(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1982).
133. Id. Liability can be alleged alternatively under both standards. See, e.g., United States
v. Hudson Farms, Inc., 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1144 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v.
Frezzo Bros., Inc., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
134. See, e.g., New York, Cent. & Hudson River Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-96
(1909); Boise Dodge Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Devel-
opments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
135. See, e.g., FIFRA § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1982); TSCA § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2615(b)(1982); CWA § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1982); RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6928(d) (West Supp. 1985); CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c) (1982). See supra notes 36-68
and accompanying text for a discussion of the criminal provisions of these statutes.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984)
(RCRA violations), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Clean Water Act violation), aff'd, 602 F.2d 1129 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980); United States v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., Cr.
No. 82-37-01-L (D.N.H. Apr. 7, 1983) (Clean Water Act, CERCLA, RCRA and related
violations).
137. See Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.) (corporation is "person in
charge" under Clean Water Act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); United States v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 464 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1972) (corporation is "person in charge" under Clean Water
Act). See generally United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958) (partnership can
"knowingly" violate ICC regulations); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000
(9th Cir. 1972) (corporate criminal liability under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
1156 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1133
agents or employees may be imputed to a corporation if the agent in-
tended to act for the corporation, even if the corporation derived no ac-
tual benefit from the acts. 138 Statements of environmental concern and
mandatory policies, coupled with claims that illegal acts must have been
due to independent, misguided individual employees, may not in all cases
shield the corporation from liability. 139 For example, this principle has
been applied to establish the liability of a "well-intentioned" municipal
corporation under the Clean Water Act. 140
Conversely, corporate officers are liable for those activities of the
corporation within their knowledge and control. The corporate shield
available in many civil actions is not present in criminal cases. 141
The language of federal environmental statutes evinces a clear intent
to impose liability to all individuals who actually participate in the man-
agement or control of hazardous waste operations, even though such in-
dividuals would normally be afforded the protection of corporate limited
liability. Such legislative mandates make it unnecessary to rely on the
traditional doctrine of "alter ego.""14
(1973). The standard jury instruction requested by the government in such cases provides: "If
you conclude that an agent of the defendant corporation, acting on behalf of the corporation
and within the scope of his employment or of his apparent authority engaged in the crimes
charged in the indictment then the defendant corporation is guilty of those crimes." See, e.g.,
Government's Request for Jury Instructions, United States v. Wes-Con, Inc., Cr. No. 80-
10040 (D. Idaho Jan. 16, 1981).
138. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 127-28 (5th Cir. 1962) (pros-
ecution under Connolly Hot Oil Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-715m (1982)).
139. Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250-51 (8th Cir. 1958) (violation of motor
carrier statute, 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1982)).
140. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
141. See United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (failure to pre-
vent or correct wrongdoing under Clean Water Act). See generally United States v. Park, 421
U.S. 658 (1975) (Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act violations); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535
F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) (Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act viola-
tions); Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers for Strict Liability Offenses-Another
View, 35 VAND. L. Rav. 1137, 1140 (1982). Corporate officials may assert an individual privi-
lege against self-incrimination with regard to corporate matters. Wilson v. United States, 221
U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911) (corporate officer may refuse to produce documents).
142. Under certain circumstances, "piercing the corporate veil" is permitted in order to
hold either corporate shareholders or officers liable for corporate activity. H. HENN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 143, 146
(1961). The general rule followed by federal courts in deciding cases involving regulatory
statutes is that the "corporate entity may be disregarded in the interests of public convenience,
fairness and equity." Capital Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Individual
officers have been held civilly liable even where the corporate veil has not been pierced. See,
e.g., United States v. Pollution Abatement Serv. of Oswego, 763 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 605 (1985); United States v. Northeast Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823
(W.D. Mo. 1984). This approach mirrors the criminal law in holding individuals liable for
their personal actions.
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When a statute contains specific directives as to when the corporate
entity may be disregarded and individuals held liable for acts of the cor-
poration, courts will defer to the congressional mandate. 143 Most recent
environmental statutes evidence such specific intent. For example, CER-
CLA section 101144 defines "owner or operator" for civil or criminal lia-
bility purposes as "any person who owned, operated, or otherwise
controlled activities" at an abandoned facility.
1 45
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,146
held that the RCRA provisions which prohibit hazardous waste treat-
ment, storage or disposal without a permit 47 apply to employees who
knowingly handle waste absent a permit and not simply to the company
owners or operators, even if the employees were not in a position to se-
cure the permit. The court decided that in order to effectuate RCRA's
substantive purpose, the statute's reference to "[a]ny person" should be
construed broadly to cover anyone with responsibility for handling regu-
lated materials even "though the result may appear harsh." '48
As an outgrowth of the fiction that corporations are "persons,"
courts have held that corporations can be guilty of conspiracy with their
employees. 149 Even in the absence of an indictment alleging conspiracy
between the corporation and its employees, joint trials of corporations
and their employees have been upheld. 5 ° Joint trials are proper where
there is a substantial identity of facts and participants among the counts
in an indictment. 5 '
III. COMPARISON OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
The experience of enforcement agencies in the past decade readily
confirms that criminal actions authorized by environmental statutes have
a much greater deterrent effect than civil actions alone. For corpora-
tions, which as abstract entities cannot be imprisoned, the greater mone-
tary sanctions often provided in criminal sanctions and the substantial
public opprobrium which attaches to criminal violators are powerful in-
143. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbot, 321 U.S. 349, 363-65 (1944).
144. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1982).
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985).
147. RCRA § 3008(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
148. 741 F.2d at 667.
149. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949); United States v. Dot-
terweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281-85 (1943).
150. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1170
(W.D.N.Y. 1979).
151. See notes 72 and 93-96 and accompanying text.
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centives to proper behavior."5 2 In addition, many corporations are con-
cerned that the stigma of a criminal conviction may affect their ability to
bid on government contracts.
1 53
It is the effect on individuals within the corporation, however, which
gives criminal sanctions their punch. Corporations act through individu-
als, primarily officers and directors who set policy and give orders. Civil
enforcement actions are typically directed against the corporation; even
when individuals are named, the costs of defending the action and paying
any resulting judgment are often covered by the corporation, and thus
seen as "a cost of doing business." 154
Criminal actions, however, invoke a greater possibility of personal
liability since they usually allege willful acts,"' 5 which are not covered by
insurance policies,156 or by the power and duty to indemnify. 157 More
importantly, criminal sanctions typically include the possibility of jail
time.158 For the well-off white collar officer with a genteel background, a
devoted family and prominent community status, the spectre of a year in
152. In one poll, 60,000 people were surveyed about the perceived severity of various
crimes. They ranked environmental offenses seventh, after murder, but ahead of heroin smug-
gling, skyjacking and armed robbery. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BULLETIN (1984).
153. Starr, EPA, Justice Described as Urging Courts to Send More Corporate Violators to
Jail, [Current Developments-Enforcement] 16 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 45 (May 10, 1985). Some
corporations have even asked the Justice Department to prosecute individual officers rather
than the corporations themselves to avoid the criminal liability from attaching to the corpora-
tion. Id.
154. For example, CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1986) gives a corpora-
tion the power to indemnify a director, officer or employee for his costs, including attorney
fees, in defending 'against a proceeding if the employee in good faith believed he was acting in
the legal and best interests of the corporation, even if the acts were in fact unlawful. See CAL.
LABOR CODE § 2802 (Deering 1976) (employer must indemnify employee for losses incurred
in discharge of duties); see also Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d 449,
123 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1975) (newspaper obligated to indemnify and provide defense for employee
sued for actions within course and scope of employment).
155. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
156. See, eg., Atlas Assurance Co. v. McCombs Corp., 146 Cal. App. 3d 135, 145, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 66, 71 (1983) (expands rule that guilty plea exonerates insurance company from liability
to defend and pay where act was "dishonest or criminal" to allow nolo contendere plea by
employee to be used against corporation). See also Grand River Lime Co. v. Ohio Casualty
Ins. Co., 32 Ohio App. 2d 178, 289 N.E. 2d 360 (1972) (liability insurer's duty to defend may
be abrogated by willful, intentional act).
157. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (Deering 1977 & Supp. 1986), for example, permits indem-
nification only if the director, officer, or employee, "in the case of a criminal proceeding, had
no reasonable cause to believe the conduct of such person was unlawful." See also CAL. LA-
BOR CODE § 2802 (Deering 1976) (Indemnify is precluded if "the employee, at the time of
obeying such directives, believed them to be unlawful.").
158. See supra notes 36-82 and accompanying text.
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county jail with all manner of miscreants can provide an impetus for law
abiding behavior that no corporate concern could match.
Initially there was some doubt that courts would readily impose
sentences on most environmental violators, since violators are likely to be
prominent citizens without prior records or other public blemishes, and
because the harm to the environment and to any perceptible victims may
not be apparent or measurable. Nonetheless, the courts have recognized
the role of criminal sanctions in environmental enforcement and, in some
cases, have meted out jail time.
15 9
In addition to these considerations, bringing criminal enforcement
actions against individuals, as well as civil actions against the corpora-
tion, may have subsidiary, practical advantages as well. Individuals sub-
jected to possible personal liability and jail time may be more motivated
to disclose information, or otherwise cooperate in an enforcement action
against the corporation if such conduct might secure a reduced sentence
or immunity in the individual prosecution. Moreover, the possibility of
subsequent individual liability may lead corporate officers, agents or em-
ployees engaged in questionable activities to bring such activities to the
attention of authorities. Given the relatively limited investigative and
enforcement resources available to federal agencies compared to the sub-
stantial amount of waste handling activity in the United States, and the
difficulties involved in acquiring and presenting evidence on past corpo-
rate conduct, voluntary compliance and the cooperation of "insiders"
when violations do occur are critical elements in an effective environmen-
tal enforcement program.
Environmental statutes acknowledge this reality, and the conflicts of
interest posed between employees and corporations when corporate pol-
icy is inconsistent with environmental concerns. These statutes protect
employees who institute or provide information for enforcement proceed-
ings from firing or economic reprisal and specify procedures for the re-
view of such grievances.16
Conversely, maintenance of a parallel civil action161 may have prac-
159. See, e.g., United States v. Distler, 9 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,700 (W.D.
Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981). See also United
States v. Lanigan, 534 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd mem, 696 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). See also Indictments & Convictions 1983-86, supra note 32,
indicating that in the period 1983 to mid-1985 at least 13 individuals were sentenced to actual
time in jail, not merely probation or suspended sentences.
160. See, e.g., TSCA § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982); CWA § 507, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1982);
RCRA § 7001, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6971 (West Supp. 1985); CAA § 322, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982);
CERCLA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1982).
161. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
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tical advantages in prosecuting a criminal case. In contrast to the liberal
discovery rules in civil cases, which generally permit discovery of all rele-
vant, nonprivileged matters, discovery in criminal cases is much more
restricted.1 62 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that
under appropriate circumstances evidence obtained through civil discov-
ery may be used in a criminal action without violating due process. 163
Parallel proceedings can thus afford environmental enforcement authori-
ties greater latitude in the investigation and assembly of evidence than if
a criminal action were filed alone. 164
IV. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL CASES
Criminal enforcement in environmental matters is such a sufficiently
recent phenomenon that many issues remain unclear. The technical ba-
sis for many violations dictates that factual investigation is critical to
determinations of liability. As in any area in which the number of poten-
tial violations threatens to overwhelm enforcement resources, the policy
choices, prosecutorial discretion, and the defendant's potential coopera-
162. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
163. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970). The Kordel Court conceded the possi-
bility of abuse and the constitutional problems involved in simultaneous proceedings. Id. at
11-12. See infra note 172 for a discussion of Kordel. See also SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d
1368, 1387 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980) (information gained in civil
investigation may be used for criminal enforcement purposes); White-Collar Crime: A Survey
of Law, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 169, 184-97 (1980); Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 67 COLUM. L. REy. 1277 (1967). To avoid this problem, one commentator has sug-
gested refashioning the criminal discovery rules to expand discovery in corporate crime cases.
He argues that the traditional justifications for narrow criminal discovery-to discourage per-
jury and the manufacture of evidence, to avoid the possibility of intimidating witnesses, and to
minimize the advantage defendants gain because of their fifth amendment privilege-are di-
luted in corporate environmental crime cases. See Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227,
1333-34 n.134 (1979).
164. According to EPA policy:
Information obtained in civil cases from subjects of a parallel proceeding may be
provided to personnel working on the criminal case, if the subjects were on notice of
the potential for a parallel criminal proceeding when the information was provided
by the subjects, and if warnings were given prior to testimonial situations.
C. Price, supra note 29, at 9. So long as determination of civil liability is at least one of the
purposes of government discovery, the information cannot be withheld merely because it
would also be useful in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 699 (Ist
Cir. 1970). On occasion, this opportunity to circumvent normal criminal discovery limitations
may also be utilized by the defendant to obtain information from the government. Thus,
courts have generally taken a narrower view of such requests. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eastland,
307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962) (defendant's motion denied), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963);
Note, Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-
The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH. L. REv. 738, 742-43 (1968).
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tion play a major role in enforcement decisions. Hence, an effective ap-
proach to environmental criminal cases is essential for corporations,
individuals and their counsel. Knowledge of the statutes and liability
issues is a necessary foundation, but in the environmental area, more
than most, the focus must be on practical policy issues. This section ex-
plores these considerations from the authors' experience in both prose-
cuting and defending environmental criminal cases.
A. Prosecutorial Standards
There are no hard and fast rules on when a criminal case should be
brought in the environmental area or when and how the decision should
be made as to whether particular conduct should be subjected to civil or
criminal enforcement. Under general Department of Justice policy,"6 5
prosecutors have almost unbounded discretion in making such decisions.
The federal government has "wide latitude in determining when, whom,
how and even whether to prosecute for apparent violations of federal
criminal law." '166
This broad discretion, often recognized by the courts, 167 applies in
the criminal environmental area, as well. In determining whether to
commence a prosecution, a decision must be made that there is probable
cause to believe that a federal offense has been committed, that the ad-
missible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain or sustain a convic-
tion and that a sufficient federal interest exists.
The general perception is that prosecutors must have broad discre-
tion to exercise fairness in executing the law. This is particularly true in
the environmental area where most civil cases could also be criminal
cases and the decision to bring a criminal case rests largely on a subjec-
tive evaluation of the seriousness and the culpability of the particular
conduct.
In exercising such discretion, prosecutors must use common sense
and good judgment in their selection of cases to assure proper enforce-
ment of the law and to maximize the possible deterrent effect. Among
the factors which most frequently enter into a prosecutor's decision in
any environmental case include: the seriousness of the offense and the
environmental harm caused; the degree of knowledge, willfulness and re-
calcitrance on the part of the alleged violators; whether the conduct rep-
165. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980) [hereinafter
cited as PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION].
166. Id. at 1.
167. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
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resents a repetition of past illegal conduct; the duration of the offense; the
ability within the particular industry to avoid violations; the effect if
criminal sanctions are not sought; the degree of an individual's responsi-
bility, control and knowledge about the illegal activity; and the effective-
ness of civil sanctions as a deterrent to protect the federal interests in the
absence of a criminal enforcement action.'
68
As a general policy, the Department of Justice looks to responsible
corporate officers, agents and employees and closely examines their po-
tential criminal liability in accord with its philosophy that enforcement
pressure on individuals greatly enhances the deterrent effect of environ-
mental statutes. The Justice Department and EPA place particular em-
phasis on cases which arise out of false reports regarding regulated
activities and cases where perpetrators have avoided the regulatory
scheme by failing to obtain required permits.'69 The government places
high priority on these types of violations because they strike at the heart
of the effectiveness and vitality of EPA's regulatory programs.
Self-reporting and voluntary compliance are the quintessence of an
effective regulatory program. The government does not have the re-
sources to oversee every permittee to ensure they are truthfully and accu-
rately reporting facility compliance status. More importantly, the
integrity of the regulatory program depends on the regulated commu-
nity's recognition of its obligation to obtain and abide by needed permits.
Thus, in EPA's view, when a court takes the position that one who could
never have obtained a permit cannot be prosecuted for activity without a
permit, as in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,' 7 ° the viability of
the entire regulatory scheme is threatened.
Unscrupulous operators who shave costs by avoiding regulatory re-
quirements undercut voluntary compliance efforts. Since nonpermitted
discharges frequently are of the most environmentally damaging type,'
168. According to Justice Department guidelines, the attorney for the government should
weigh all relevant considerations including:
(a) federal law enforcement priorities;
(b) nature and seriousness of the offense;
(c) deterrent effect of prosecution;
(d) the person's culpability in connection with the offense;
(e) the person's history with respect to criminal activity;
(f) the person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of
others; and
(g) the probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, supra note 165, at 6-7.
169. Id.
170. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1171 (1985); see supra notes 112-
15 & 146-48 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ralston
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not only are such operators undercutting regulatory goals, from a public
health standpoint they are also the most dangerous. Thus, the govern-
ment's highest priority is to prosecute these violations and the individu-
als who engage in them, aid and abet them, or fail to take action or set up
procedures to stop them.
In general, the policy of all federal government enforcement efforts
in the environmental area has been to impress upon individuals that they
must take seriously their obligation, both as individuals and as corporate
officers, to ensure that environmental laws are obeyed and that harms to
the environment are averted. Lawyers for such corporations are viewed
as having special obligations, ethical as well as legal. The Justice Depart-
ment looks very closely at cases in which attorneys have arguably be-
come a part of willful illegal activity.
The broad discretion given to prosecutors, and the policy considera-
tions which guide them, come into play in shaping the nature of the rem-
edy sought. At the outset, nearly all environmental statutes authorize
the government to seek civil as well as criminal sanctions. In general,
courts have held that the use of parallel civil and criminal proceedings in
appropriate circumstances does not violate constitutional due process.
172
Both EPA and the Department of Justice have policy guidelines for de-
termining when parallel proceedings are warranted. 173 In general, crimi-
nal sanctions will be sought to supplement civil penalties when the
conduct is especially egregious or willful, the deterrent effect is likely to
Purina Co., 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,257 (W.D. Ky. 1982); United States v.
Distler, 9 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,700 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd, 671 F.2d 954
(6th Cir. 1981).
172. There are no reported environmental cases contesting the use of parallel proceedings.
However, in United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 (1970), the United States Supreme Court
held that enforcement of a public welfare statute, the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, would be
unduly stultified if the government were forced to choose one type of investigation over an-
other, or to defer one action pending final resolution of the other. See also United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); United States v. Gel Spice, 773 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.
1985); SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993
(1980). In the environmental area, however, where there is no bright line procedure for imme-
diately granting criminal prosecution requests for information obtained in a civil context-
information which would be identified initially as focusing on criminal violations-the govern-
ment owes environmental defendants an extra level of care. The government must be sure that
due process considerations are observed and that prosecutorial misconduct does not result
from contrary use of civil information gathering techniques once the focus of a case shifts to
criminal prosecution. But see supra notes 161-64 for a discussion of concurrently pursuing
civil and criminal action as a discovery device.
173. See, e.g., Memorandum from Judson W. Starr, Director, Envtl. Crimes Unit, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to F. Henry Habicht II, Assistant U.S. Attorney Gen., Land & Natural Re-
sources Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Parallel Proceedings in the Enforcement of Environmental
Law (Jan. 28, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Starr Memorandum]; C. Price, supra note 29.
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be widespread, and the individuals bear responsibility to a significant de-
gree for the improper practices. Conversely, civil relief will be used to
supplement a criminal action when ongoing hazardous activity is in-
volved and injunctive relief is appropriate, when recovery of funds ex-
pended for remedial action is needed, or when the maintenance of
parallel proceedings is permissible and offers procedural or tactical
advantages.1 74
An added dimension to prosecutorial discretion on the federal level
is the decision of whether to bring a concurrent federal action when state
criminal proceedings are pending or likely. Under many environmental
statutes, states are authorized to administer federal regulatory require-
ments so that criminal provisions are concurrently enforceable by both
state and federal authorities. 171 Courts have held that concurrent crimi-
nal proceedings do not per se constitute double jeopardy.1 76 Federal
prosecutors, then, must decide when parallel federal prosecution is
warranted.
EPA has a concurrent proceeding policy which provides guidance to
avoid the potential for abuse inherent in double actions. 177 The Depart-
ment of Justice typically brings such actions only if it believes the state
prosecution was inadequate in establishing a legal principle or deterring
illegal conduct.
1 78
Since federal and state authorities may differ on what constitutes
"adequate" enforcement, corporations and individuals should be aware
that a second prosecution is possible. Courts are mindful of the potential
for abuse in concurrent enforcement actions in the civil arena and have
been willing on occasion to block such actions, particularly in areas like
the Clean Water Act and RCRA, where the legislature has mandated a
primary role for state enforcement efforts. 179 Presumably courts would
174. Buente Telephone Conversation, supra note 7. See C. Price, supra note 29, at 2-3;
Starr Memorandum, supra note 173, at 2-4. See also supra notes 172-73 and accompanying
text for a discussion about the procedural or tactical advantages of parallel suits.
175. See, e.g., CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982); RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6926
(West Supp. 1985); CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
176. See United States v. Ward, 676 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir.) (federal criminal prosecution
after conviction of individual on state charges is not double jeopardy because elements and
proof required were sufficiently different), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
177. See generally C. Price, supra note 29, at 4-13.
178. Mr. Ramsey, as former Chief of the Justice Department's Environmental Enforcement
section, was integrally involved in implementing the Department's concurrent proceeding
policy.
179. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980) (EPA
estopped from bringing parallel action under Clean Water Act by adequate prior state action);
United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981) (EPA estopped from bringing
parallel action by adequate prior state action); Shell Oil v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, 77 (N.D.
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take an even stricter view of possible abuse in parallel criminal
prosecutions.
B. Managing the Defense for Criminal Investigations
A detailed discussion of how to manage the defense of a criminal
investigation in the environmental law area is beyond the scope of this
Article since many of the legal issues involved are both complex and
unclear. This is especially true in the context of statutes such as CER-
CLA and RCRA, since many of the enforcement issues are only now
being addressed in reported opinions. However, there are a number of
broad areas which should be given prompt and careful attention by any
regulated entity which is, or may be, the subject of a criminal
prosecution.
The corporation should immediately seek the advice of an outside
counsel experienced in environmental criminal enforcement actions at
the earliest indication that the government is proceeding criminally. In
most cases, corporate counsel know little environmental law, in-house
technical people have little legal expertise, and even regular environmen-
tal counsel may be unfamiliar with the added complexities of a criminal
case. "Learning on the case" is rarely a wise course; in criminal prosecu-
tion the need for expertise is even more pressing.
Early involvement of experienced counsel has two distinct advan-
tages. First, it may be possible to demonstrate that no criminal activity
occurred, prior to and without the need for indictment. Alternatively,
when the attorney is familiar with the history of the case, one of defend-
ant's disadvantages will not include the counsel's playing "catch up" be-
cause he became involved at a stage too late in the case. The continuity
of counsel, for both substantive and strategic reasons, is critical to de-
fending a criminal environmental case. Once outside counsel is ap-
pointed, the accused then should form an in-house team to work with
outside counsel or consultants to manage the flow of information in order
to ensure a consistent defense approach to the case.180
Cal. 1976) (Congress intended that EPA act only when "a state fails to act."), aff'd, 585 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1978). In what is apparently the first case involving a challenge to parallel
actions under RCRA, an EPA Administrative Law Judge, in In re Matter of BKK Corp., No.
RCRA-IX-84-0012 (Apr. 18, 1984), held that where the state had engaged in adequate en-
forcement action, albeit not identical to that intended by EPA, EPA was precluded from insti-
tuting enforcement action based on the same alleged violations. On appeal, an EPA
Administrator affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of EPA action, but vacated
the opinion as a precedent. In re Matter of BKK Corp., No. RCRA-IX-84-0012, aff'd and
vacated, (Oct. 23, 1985).
180. In contrast to civil enforcement actions, criminal cases are governed by the so-called
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The corporation or individual should instruct counsel, and any in-
house team working with counsel, to set up procedures for determining
exactly what conduct is taking place with respect to discharges, waste
handling and disposal, regulatory compliance, notification, or whatever
else may be the subject of the criminal indictment. Such information is
essential in evaluating the merits of the accused's defense, determining
which evidentiary privileges or other legal defenses may be appropriate,
and, in the case of corporations, indemnifying responsible individuals
and providing a basis for remedial activities and procedures to correct
improper conduct. This information will also facilitate responses to gov-
ernment requests for information in other civil or criminal enforcement
actions. It is preferable that this investigation be conducted by outside
legal counsel to ensure that, to the extent possible, the attorney-client
privilege attaches to the information learned.
An essential part of this initial process, in the case of a company or
corporation, is to determine who should speak for the company with re-
spect to the enforcement action. A consistent, coordinated and unified
response by the company is critical, especially since information pro-
vided in statements made to the government may be the source of subse-
quent criminal sanctions. 8' The identification of responsible individuals
is important not only in facilitating the corporation's defense, but also in
ensuring that the corporation fulfills its legal obligations with respect to
such officers or employees. Under state law, officers, agents or employees
who are subjected to criminal prosecution based on activities conducted
within the scope and authority of their employment may be entitled to
have the corporation provide a legal defense and indemnity."8 2
It is important to identify any possible conflicts of interest between
the corporation and its officers or employees as early as possible in the
corporation's own investigation; otherwise, the corporation may be in the
position of soliciting information and statements from employees which
later may be used against the individuals.8 3 This is especially important
since statements which an individual could avoid by invoking the fifth
amendment protections may be discoverable from a corporation, since
corporations have no fifth amendment privilege. 84 Moreover, a corpora-
tion's interests will often differ from those of the individual. For exam-
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-3174 (West Supp. 1985), which establishes various
specific time limits to ensure that criminal cases progress rapidly.
181. See supra notes 37-38, 48, 52, 67, 71 & 76 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
184. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 699 (1944).
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ple, the corporation may claim that the acts were outside the course and
scope of employment or willful and deliberate, and thus potentially ex-
cuse the corporation from imputed liability.1 8 5 As such, the corpora-
tion's lawyer or investigators may be open to charges that they solicited
information without adequately advising the officer or employee that at-
torney-client confidentiality would not attach.
A corporation should do its best to establish an effective and cooper-
ative relationship with the governmental regulators, district attorney or
other legal enforcement personnel. As noted, enforcement officials have
considerable latitude in the criminal enforcement of environmental stat-
utes1" 6 and the culpability and cooperation of an alleged violator are im-
portant factors in determining how to exercise that discretion. Even if
the decision is made to prosecute a criminal case, a record of cooperation
and good faith can encourage the prosecutor or the court to consider
"alternative sentencing" in place of onerous fines or incarceration.'
7
Although the statutes provide broad and sweeping powers to gov-
ernmental enforcement agencies, the staff resources and time available to
invoke such powers is often quite limited and strained. Corporations
which adopt a cooperative attitude, assist in the government investiga-
tion to the extent consistent with their own interests, and exhibit a will-
ingness to take remedial actions or to accept responsibility, when
appropriate, are more likely to secure an out-of-court resolution of the
matter or a prosecution on better terms than might otherwise be the case.
In some cases, disciplining employees responsible for violations but who
lack high corporate knowledge has deterred the government from crimi-
nally prosecuting corporations. Conversely, the more traditional crimi-
185. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
187. Despite some dissension within the Department of Justice over whether "alternative
sentencing" is appropriate, the government has acceded to a wide range of nontraditional sen-
tence structuring as a condition of a defendant's probation or as part of the court's sentence.
The authors' survey of Department of Justice enforcement actions showed that some form of
alternative sentencing was employed in one-fourth to one-third of the cases involving individu-
als. See Indictments & Convictions 1983-86, supra note 32. The most common sentence im-
posed was "community service," in amounts ranging from 100 to 1000 hours. One company
was directed to set up an $850,000 environmental trust fund; other defendants have paid
$45,000 to the Girl Scout Council of St. Louis, $5000 to the Big Horn County Agricultural
Extension Service, $5000 to the "Foundation for the People" for a white collar crime rehabili-
tation program, and have agreed to turn over proceeds of land owned by the corporation to
CERCLA (Superfund) for cleanup costs. Several individual defendants agreed not to partici-
pate in any hazardous waste business for five years and one was ordered to enter an alcoholic
treatment program. Indictments & Convictions 1983-86, supra note 32. Courts favor this
approach since it at least purports to do something positive for the public, unlike the collection
of general fines or the imprisonment of otherwise responsible citizens.
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nal enforcement posture of resisting at every stage and on every ground
may not be in the long term interest of the corporation or responsible
individuals in this specific area. Yet in some cases, it may be the only
possible defensive posture. Finding and striking the appropriate balance
may determine whether a client goes to jail or pays a civil fine.
Potential defendants must be made aware that criminal environmen-
tal cases may turn on technical, scientific issues. At an early stage, the
company should employ, through outside counsel, the most capable con-
sultants to work with the defense team in developing the technical issues
in the case. In this connection, as with all federal agencies, EPA has
many components, not all of which communicate with each other.
Moreover, EPA and other federal agencies sponsor, or actually conduct
in-house, many scientific studies and produce reports which may be help-
ful to a defendant in a criminal case. Similarly, internal EPA debate on
the appropriate interpretation of a regulation may provide a basis for a
defense in a technically oriented case. Thus, the use of the Freedom of
Information Act'88 and a knowledge of agency policy, legal interpreta-
tions and bureaucratic organization may be critical to the defense of a
client.
Finally, in the case of significant substantive violations, the corpora-
tion should consider an immediate and thorough environmental audit by
experienced environmental counsel and/or a site characterization. Inves-
tigations may be undertaken by in-house personnel where qualified, but
such investigations, if used in later proceedings or made public," 9 are
likely to impact the government's investigation and prosecution only if
perceived as objective. Consequently, the better approach is usually to
188. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 111984)).
189. Some corporations are reluctant to ask outside counsel to perform an audit because it
may be discoverable by government enforcement authorities. Under appropriate conditions, a
privilege may protect such studies. The common law attorney-client privilege protects confi-
dential communications between an attorney and his client about legal matters, Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981), but the privilege extends only to legal advice, not to
business or technical assistance, Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d
854, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980). An audit should meet the requirements for attachment of the
privilege. Although an audit is a technical document, it is a communication between the coun-
sel who prepared it and his or her client undertaken for the purpose of determining the clients'
liabilities. See Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 54 F.R.D. 44, 46 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (patent
materials privileged because "documents containing considerable technical factual information
but which were nonetheless primarily concerned with giving legal guidance to the client were
classified as privileged").
A site assessment performed by expert consultants, which consists of an objective, techni-
cal assessment of site geology, contamination, and possible remedial measures, should be as-
sumed to be non-privileged. In most significant cases, it can be required by the enforcing
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retain one of the many scientific consulting firms who specialize in this
area. Such an investigation will provide the corporation with a scientific
basis for evaluating its position and for disputing, where appropriate, the
government's claims of damages to persons or property. Accurate infor-
mation in this area is essential to the corporation's decision on how to
defend against the criminal case.
In addition, such site characterizations may help to diffuse public
hysteria or refute media reports concerning widespread or substantial en-
vironmental dangers. A reasoned assessment showing either a lack of
significant potential harm or a lack of causation between the alleged inju-
ries and the corporation's activities may alleviate such public outcries.
Since public pressure often fuels enforcement efforts (perhaps more so on
the state level where enforcement officials are more directly responsible
to the electorate), management of public relations can be a crucial ele-
ment in a corporation's response to a criminal enforcement effort.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of criminal sanctions is receiving increased emphasis in the
enforcement of environmental statutes. Federal criminal enforcement
programs, after a slow start, are maturing into effective programs with
identifiable standards and procedures. EPA and the Department of Jus-
tice are now beginning to flex the considerable muscle given them by
these sweeping statutes. Unlike traditional criminal cases, there are also
likely to be a full set of technical issues which arise in a civil context.
The government's case is typically better prepared and receives more
support than most civil environmental matters and thus, defense counsel
must be especially prepared to meet the government's case with a strong
defense. The complexity of these cases, the risk for defendants and the
government's vigor in prosecution, point to difficult times for those en-
meshed in environmental criminal cases as defendants.
authority. See, e.g., RCRA § 3013(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a) (1982); CERCLA § 104(e), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(e) (1982).
Privilege questions as to documents underscore the need for early involvement of counsel.
See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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